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This book presents a new approach in monetary theory and policy. Adair 
Turner is not a mere academic economist1, but he was one of the regulators who 
had to deal with the Þ nancial crisis in UK. Adair Turner held no ofÞ cial policy 
role before the crisis. As a head of Financial Services Authority (FSA) he was 
involved in dealing with the consequences of the global Þ nancial crisis and its ef-
fects on the Þ nancial industry in the City of London, who is still global Þ nancial 
centre and the most important Þ nancial centre in European Union. In introductory 
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1  Jonathan Adair Turner, Baron Turner of Ecchinswell, is a British businessman, academic 
and was Chairman of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) until its abolition in March 2013. 
He is the former Chairman of the Pensions Commission and the Committee on Climate Change, 
as well as the former Director-General of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). On 29 May 
2008, it was announced that he would take over as Chairman of the Financial Services Author-
ity. He took up this post on 20 September 2008 for a Þ ve-year term to succeed Callum McCarthy. 
Currently he is Chairman of the The Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET). From that, he 
wrote a book “Between Debt and the Devil: Money, Credit, and Fixing Global Finance”. On Sept. 
7th 2005 he was created a life peer as Baron Turner of Ecchinswell, awarded in recognition of his 
public service to the nation. In 2016 he was elected an Honorary Fellow of the Royal Society. I am 
indebted to Dr. Adair Turner for kindly sending me the book, encouraging me thus to study more 
deeply post - crisis monetary economics. We hope that Þ nancial experts in Croatia and SEE will 
have more insights in modern monetary theory, and that policy makers, in particular central bank-
ers will be inß uenced by these new ideas for radical monetary reform. 
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pages of this excellent book, Adair Turner made a clear statement that he was not 
fully aware how deep was the crisis and obviously it was the main motive to write 
this book, that we could understand the cause roots of the Þ nancial crisis and 
how to avoid the next crisis? He stated that „the lack of foresight did not reß ect 
blind fate in free Þ nancial markets. I always believed that Þ nancial markets were 
susceptible to surges of irrational exuberance: I was unconvinced by the EfÞ cient 
Market Hypothesis“ (p. XII). To understand that, we have to return to the ques-
tions usually ignored by the policy makers and Þ nancial industry. Author had to 
return to the insights of the early and mid – twentieth – century economists, such 
as Knut Wicksell, Fridrich Hayek, John Maynard Keynes, Irving Fisher, Frank 
Knight and Henry Simmons. Adair Turner said that he had to „discover“ the writ-
ings of Hyman Minsky (see, Minsky, 1986), monetary economist that was largely 
marginalized by the mainstream of the discipline2. Adair Turner understands the 
need for more Þ nancial regulation, and he said: „Radical policy implications fol-
low. I now believe that banks should operate with leverage levels (the ratio of total 
assets to equity) more like Þ ve than the twenty – Þ ve or higher that we allowed 
before the crisis. And I argue that governments and central banks should some-
times stimulate economies by printing money to Þ nance increased Þ scal deÞ cits. 
To many people the Þ rst proposal is absurdly radical and the second dangerously 
irresponsible: to many, too, they appear contradictory. But I hope to convince you 
that they are entirely consistent and appropriate, given the cause of the 2007 – 
2008 crisis and severe post – crisis recession. In 2008 I had no idea that I would 
make such proposals. (p. XIII).“
In a nutshell, these words precisely reß ect the main message of the book, 
how to prevent new Þ nancial crisis, how to re–regulate Þ nancial industry (private 
banks), how to limit excessive credit creation by the commercial bankers, without 
sufÞ cient inß uence on the money supply by the central banks and regulators, all 
in order to prevent boom - bust Mynskian cycles and instability of disinß ationary 
phase of Þ nancial cycles, when there is a deß ation threat that is devastating for the 
unemployment (deß ationary spiral) and social/political stability. 
2  Hyman MInsky acquired acknowledgement and wide spread respect among Þ nancial and 
academic community in the wake of global Þ nancial crisis, when Lehman Brothers collapsed trig-
gering global Þ nancial crisis, by melting down the asset bubble on the Wall Street. This moment of 
bubbles burst and sharp disinß ation was then called in honour of Minsky as „Minsky’s moment“ 
(The Economist, 2016), who actually predicted global Þ nancial crisis. In addition, we think that it 
was highly important when Minsky gained acceptance by the academics (Randal Wray, 2016) and 
opinion makers, for instance, Martin Wolf, chief economist in Financial Times, who published an 
remarkable book on Þ nancial crisis (Wolf, 2014) in which his basic theoretical  framework is „inher-
ent Þ nancial instability theory“ formulated by Hyman Minsky. Dr. Turner called his approach also as 
Keynes/Minsky theories to emphasize the difference with Neoclassical theories (see, Turner, 2012). 
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The book contains Þ ve basic chapters. The Þ rst part („Swollen Finance“), 
begins with the explanation of (potential) instability of the Þ nancial sector of the 
economy, the pre–crisis assessment of the “Þ nancialization” (excessive credit ex-
pansion in deregulated economy, when there are many incentives for Þ nancial 
deepening and creation of the debt overhang). Pre–crisis orthodoxy was based on 
the monetary consensus that more Þ nance was good for the economy and Þ nancial 
markets had a beneÞ cial inß uence on the real economy, while there is no need for 
the regulation of the Þ nancial industry, because the Þ nancial markets are perfect 
and macroeconomic equilibrium has to be achieved without any intervention by 
the state or/and central banks. Some orthodox economists found that „Þ nancial 
deepening“ is beneÞ cial for growth, and that there are positive correlations be-
tween private credit to GDP ratio and between stock markets turnover and growth. 
This consensus (supported with numerous empirical and quantitative analyses) 
turned out to be completely wrong. Adair Turner presents several main failures in 
such consensus, three pre–orthodoxy intellectual errors: (1) a failure to recognize 
that Þ nancial markets are different from other markets; Þ nancial markets are inef-
Þ cient and irrational, the EfÞ cient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and Rational Expec-
tations Hypothesis (REH), as theoretical foundations of pre–crisis monetary or-
thodoxy, are not appropriate for modern and complex Þ nancial systems; (2) igno-
rance of the crucial macroeconomic implications of credit and money creation, of 
banks, shadow banking systems and particular types of debt in general; and, (3) a 
failure to recognize that relationship between Þ nance and development is not lin-
ear and limitless, that debt above certain levels is harmful. Part two („Dangerous 
Debt“), focuses on debt – Þ nanced growth before crisis and why it caused harm, 
even though inß ation remain low and stable? In this chapter, Lord Turner describes 
why debt contracts can be valuable but also dangerous and how banks create cred-
it, money and purchasing power. Here is also explanation of the importance of 
urba n real estate in modern market economies, and why banks created too much 
of the wrong sort of debt (through mortgage lending), instability and crisis. Exces-
sive leverage growth, unsustainable dynamics of growth of private debt produced 
a severe post – crisis debt overhang, leading to the situation that Þ xing the banks 
will not be sufÞ cient to Þ x the economy. Turner said that more radical policies will 
be required. Recovery and growth is possible after the crisis, but there is urgent 
need to address three drivers of, as Lord Turner states, „unnecessary“ credit 
growth – rising real estate values, increasing inequality and global imbalances. 
The most important message of this part of the book, is that we have to recognize 
that government stimulus of demand, through money Þ nanced deÞ cits, is less dan-
gerous than private credit creation. Before the 2007 – 2008 Þ nancial crisis private 
credit grew rapidly and far faster than growth of GDP in almost all advanced 
economies, as well in post–transition economies in CESEE and other emerging 
markets (including China). The result of such dynamics on the Þ nancial markets 
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was the increase of private leverage, the ratio of private credit to GDP. Real econo-
mies leverage grew, because private credit grew faster than nominal GDP. The 
development of „fractional reserve banks“ was beneÞ cial for the development of 
the Þ nancial markets and many empirical studies have found evidence that „Þ nan-
cial deepening“ is good for the economic growth. But, in the pre-crisis orthodoxy 
there was also lack of understanding how excessive private credit leverage could 
be harmful, as Minsky said - „stability destabilizes“. Turner explained Þ ve fea-
tures of debt contracts that make them potentially dangerous, but the most impor-
tant are three of them: (1) „sudden stop“ phenomena, when debt markets can be 
susceptible to „sudden stops“ in new credit supply, and reÞ nancing of existing debt 
contract became impossible, due to new assessments of risks, that were previously 
ignored or underestimated by the creditors and investors and bankers are not will-
ing to lend new money; (2) asset prices falls, or, asset – price disinß ationary dy-
namics produced by „sudden stop“ or loss of conÞ dence into the market stability, 
when debt contracts with various types of assets as a collateral for credits became 
risky and unsecured loans, leading to the credit crunch and causing insolvency of 
the banks (rising NPLs, because of the reduced asset prices). NPLs and credit 
crunch can be powerful drivers of Þ nancial and macroeconomic instability. Lord 
Turner describes this Þ nancial market dynamics as self–reinforcing „debt deß a-
tion“, which was originally formulated by Irving Fisher. In his 1911 book, Fisher 
described a theory of Þ nancial crises that tied them to over-borrowing during the 
expansion phase that preceded the crisis, and to the changes in the purchasing 
power of money that this expansion causes, then to the collapse in credit and the 
drop in the price level. This idea reached its best exposition in his 1933 article 
“The Debt Deß ation Theory of Great Depressions” (Fisher, 1933). Irving Fisher 
stated there that the causes of all great depressions appear to be “over-indebtedness 
to start with and deß ation following soon after; that where any of the other factors 
do become conspicuous, they are often merely effects of symptoms of these two.“ 
(Shiller, 2011, p. 1). Dr. Turner fully acknowledged Fisher’s contribution and based 
his research on debt – deß ation theory formulated by Irving Fisher. „A key theme 
of this book is the danger of too much debt. Beyond the certain level, increasing 
leverage makes the economy more fragile“ (p. 134). Important also is that Lord 
Turner challenges the conventional wisdom of the Þ nancial intermediation of the 
banks, in which banks create money (lending to the corporate sector of economy) 
on the basis of deposits collection of households. This standard textbook descrip-
tion of the modern banks is largely Þ ctional, and it fails to capture their essential 
role in credit creation, money and thus purchasing power. Banks create credit and 
money through „maturity transformation“ and thus they play a crucial role in stim-
ulating nominal demand growth. If the creation of purchasing power is directed 
toward investments, this will stimulate faster economic growth and employment. 
The opposite will happen when banks skew purchasing power toward various 
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types of asset speculations. So, how much credit banks create and to what pur-
poses that credit is devoted are therefore issues of vital importance for economic 
and monetary policies. In chapter four, there is explanation of the importance of 
certain categories of credit, with the division among Þ nance for investment, con-
sumption and existing assets. Actually, this part of the book describes various 
types of unsustainable private credit devoted for consumption and existing asset 
Þ nancing, that proves to be unsustainable and leading to debt overhang. In terms 
deÞ ned by Hyman Minsky, the banking/Þ nancial system has progressed from 
„Hedge“ to a „Speculative“ system, with two negative consequences: the Þ rst, mis-
allocation of resources and the second, debt overhang effect. It is very important 
how the author analyses debt overhang related to credit booms that are not results 
from new investment Þ nancing, but it is instead focused entirely on already exist-
ing assets. Such type of credit booms, focused on existing assets Þ nancing, could 
lead into supercharged version of the credit cycles, described by Minsky. The 
problem of modern banking today is that only minor share of their lending activi-
ties constitutes lending to the productive investment, through intermediation 
mechanism of funding investments from the households’ savings. The importance 
of real estate in wealth of the country as well as a major share of banking lending 
activities could generate asymmetric dynamics of credit and asset price cycles. 
Namely, lending against real estate, from the private perspective of individual 
banks, became proÞ table and less risky categories of lending, more manageable 
loan portfolio that is secured against credit risks, although in emerging economies, 
due to euroization process, these types of debt contracts are potentially very risky, 
because private banks are not able to transfer foreign exchange risk to the borrow-
ers, and in case of sudden stop or/and bubble burst and credit crunch, it is trans-
lated into the credit risk of the lenders (private commercial banks). In addition, 
lending against real estate – in particular against existing real estate – generates 
self – reinforcing cycles of credit supply, credit demand and asset prices. Almost 
unlimited credit supply by the modern banking system is fuelling asset price inß a-
tion, rising prices of existing real estate with “net wealth gain” for the borrowers, 
which led to rising conÞ dence of the market players, borrowers and lenders. Bor-
rowers are willing to borrow more because net wealth effect gives them conÞ dence 
to borrow more for any given loan to value (LTV) and conÞ dence is strengthened 
by the expectations that asset prices will steadily rise, which in turn will increase 
the value of the real estate and wealth of the borrower. Such credit and asset price 
cycles are supported also with the limited supply of new real estate, and result is 
the divergence between credit supply (almost unlimited) and real estate (limited 
supply of new real estate and existing real estate are more expensive, fuelling thus 
asset bubbles). As Lord Turner describes: „at the very core of Þ nancial instability 
in modern economies thus lies an interface between an inÞ nite capacity and in-
elastic constraint. Banks, unless constrained by policy, have an inÞ nite capacity to 
D. RADOŠEVIĆ: Between Debt and the Devil: Money, Credit and Fixing Global Finance
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 67 (5) 496-514 (2016) 501
create credit, money and purchasing power; so do shadow banking systems. But 
supply of locationally desirable real estate (and ultimately land) is always some-
what inelastic and in some cities close to Þ xed. Potentially inÞ nite nominal de-
mand and Þ nite supply combine to make the price locationally speciÞ c real estate 
indeterminate and potentially volatile. The resulting credit and asset price cycles 
are not just part of the story of Þ nancial instability in modern economies, they are 
in its very essence (p. 73.).“ Inherent instability of the Þ nancial system, will trigger 
Þ nancial crisis in the downswing, when economies turn into the bubble burst phase 
of Minskyan Þ nancial cycle. Falling asset prices will reduce wealth effect of the 
borrowers, and lending against real estate will not be fully covered with the value 
of the collateralised real estate, these loans becomes unsecured assets, with col-
lateral that is not securing the loans that are granted by the banks, which leads to 
the lower quality of the loan portfolio (NPLs), insolvency and credit crunch, sud-
den stop to the rapid pre–crisis credit growth. The economy is left facing a debt 
overhang effect. Consequences are dire, economy is in debt–deß ation crisis. To 
reduce debt, borrowers starts deleveraging, which shrinks their balance–sheets 
(economist Richard Koo, calls it „balance- sheet recession“). Rapid deleveraging 
and deß ation depresses demand in the economy. Post–crisis conventional view on 
debt overhang is that restoring the banking system stability is the key priority. This 
is the „banking view“, but the „debt view“ is that we should have a signiÞ cant 
personal debt forgiveness. Dr. Turner’s judgement is that both credit supply and 
credit demand matter3. Lord Turner describes post–crisis dynamics in resolving 
debt overhang. The private debt has been reduced through rapid corporate – sector 
deleveraging, and shifts into the rising government debt. Increasing public debt 
shifts focus of policy makers into the Þ scal consolidation policies as a remedy for 
high levels of public debt and Þ scal deÞ cits, although it is evident that root cause 
of crisis and post – crisis developments is in private debt overhang and debt – de-
ß ation recession. Once high leverage exists, all policy levers seem imperfect. But 
the author made here a very important conclusion that „governments and central 
3  Describing policies aimed to restore credit supply in European Union, Lord Turner is refer-
ring to the new facilities of the central banks that directly funded real economy lending (Bank of 
England and European central bank). He thinks that monetary policy was effectively transmitted to 
cheap credit supply, but the demand was not there, because borrowers were already overleveraged. 
In essence, it is the question of effectiveness of the monetary policy instruments of the ECB, in 
particular T-LTRO 2 facility, which was effectively used by the banks for reÞ nancing the previously 
granted T- LTRO loans. Cheap credit supply was not transmitted to the real economy. According to 
some relevant analysis, there is a problem with benchmarks and the size of the incentive offered by 
T-LTRO2, that will inß uence the effectiveness of this ECB facility (Gros, Valiante and De Groen, 
2016). In combination with other non – standard measures, in June 2016, ECB has introduced new 
Þ nancing facility, the „Corporate Sector Purchase Programme“ (CSPP), i.e. outright purchases of 
investment – grade euro – denominated bonds issued by non – bank corporations, some sort of di-
rected credit by the central bank to corporate sector of economy. 
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banks together never run out of ammunition to counter the effects of debt overhang 
and deß ation as long as they are willing to consider the full range of available 
policy options (p. 87)“4. In chapter six, author describes globalization, liberaliza-
tion and innovation. In the section where domestic liberalization of Þ nancial sys-
tems is described, Lord Turner elaborates three major areas of liberalization, that 
had long term consequences on the development and stability of the Þ nancial in-
dustry. First were removed restrictions on the quantity of lending in the economy, 
either total or in speciÞ c sectors. Removal of quantitative instruments of monetary 
control, was to be determined by free market forces, in accordance with the pre – 
crisis orthodoxy and this resulted in excessive private credit growth, focused most-
ly in real estate lending5. Second area of domestic liberalization was the removal 
of distinctions between different types of banks, investment, retail and corporate. 
The last area of liberalization was increasing focus of central banks on low and 
stable inß ation rate, as the sole primary objective of monetary policy. This mone-
tary policy approach largely ignored various types of inß ation, it was focused on 
core inß ation, while asset price inß ation was left to free market forces, because 
Þ nancial markets are self – regulated and always in equilibrium. Thus, domestic 
4  This is very important conclusion because there is a shared view in many EU countries that 
central banks are currently running out of the ammunition, and that the only possible policy options 
for debt overhang issue is Þ scal consolidation (austerity) and internal devaluation. Post – crisis de-
ß ation was treated as a good policy for structural reforms of the market economies, and it was and 
still is tolerated by central banks and governments in many European economies, including Croatia. 
From historical prospective this could be very harmful, very similar to „liquidationist“ policy ap-
proach in USA after the Great Crash, when, for instance, Treasury Secretary Mellon said: „the best 
policy was to liquidate labour, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate ... It will 
purge the rottenness out of the system .. People will work harder, live a more moral life. Values will 
be adjusted, and enterprising people will pick up the wrecks from the less competent people“ (Aha-
med, 2010, p. 364). Also, there is a consensus among economic historians that monetary interven-
tions were the most effective policy option in recovery of the US economy during FDR’s New Deal. 
Plenty of policies are left, and the most radical policy ideas fuse Þ scal and monetary policy. Lord 
Turner is one of the most inß uential proponents of such radical policy ideas, breaking the taboos in 
economic thinking. 
5  Domestic liberalization of the Þ nancial sector and capital account liberalization were high 
on the agenda of Washington consensus and was stumbling block in stand – by arrangements by 
the IMF. „The Washington consensus of the 1980s and 1990s sought to prevent government credit 
misallocation by depoliticizing credit markets, but liberalization simply swapped one danger for 
another” (p. 143). There were few exceptions in Asian emerging markets (S. Korea, Japan, China) 
who practiced rediscounting private – sector loans by the central bank, or they used guidance (moral 
suasion) or instructions to the banks and decide criteria that deÞ ned whether loans could be „redis-
counted“ at the central bank and thus effectively funded by it. This is very close to money Þ nance, 
but with the resources lent to the private sector, rather than extended to the government. As a matter 
of fact, it is private credit allocation versus rediscounting private – sector loans by the central bank 
facilities. Credit allocation is the most important element of post – crisis monetary policy in market 
economies (for instance, it is the case also with Croatia, see: Radosevic and Vidakovic, 2015). 
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liberalization of Þ nancial market paves the way for future instability: Þ rst, it laid 
down the basis for excessive credit expansion and misallocation of bank credits, 
leading to asset price inß ation, debt overhang effects and Minskyan Þ nancial cy-
cle. We could conclude that domestic Þ nancial liberalization was at the root of the 
Þ nancial crisis. We can not but fully agree with the author when he concluded that 
„the amount of credit created and its allocation is too important to be left to bank-
ers; nor can it be left to free markets in securitized credit“ (p. 104).“ More complex 
systems of Þ nancial intermediation need more regulation by the regulators and 
central banks to prevent inherent Þ nancial instability. Basically, central banks have 
to implement Þ nancial stability – oriented monetary policy, monetary strategy that 
will enable optimal level of inß ation6 and stability of the Þ nancial system (see 
more on this issue, in: Eichengreen et al., 2011; Borio, 2014). These two goals have 
to be addressed with monetary policy strategy and macro prudential strategy of 
the central banks. We support ideas that mildly positive rate of inß ation can make 
easier to service already accumulated debt; because according to „Fisher effect“ 
deß ation increases real interest rates and it is reinforcing deleveraging and shrink-
ing the balance–sheet of the corporate sector, which will reduce nominal demand, 
and results in recession or „secular stagnation“ with rising unemployment. Conse-
quently, positive inß ation – in a range between 3–4 percent - is beneÞ cial for debt 
servicing in post–crisis recession7, and reß ationary monetary policy is needed. 
Lord Turner is more daring in his ideas and he is proposing government Þ at mon-
ey creation, because Þ at money can create purchasing power and thus aggregate 
nominal demand. In addition, there is possibility to create credit and money by the 
private banks, but private creation of money has been deregulated and could bring 
additional instability. Therefore, if we do not allow to use overt money Þ nance of 
Þ scal deÞ cits („monetization of Þ scal deÞ cits“ is strictly forbidden in EMU and 
EU), then market economies have to rely only on private credit and money cre-
ation, which is currently limited with constraints in Þ nancial markets: debt over-
hang, rapid deleveraging, credit crunch and insufÞ cient money/credit supply and 
credit demand. Credit and money policies of private banks were pro – cyclical, as 
the Chicago economist Henry Simmons concluded that „in the very nature of the 
6  There is  a strong consensus that continuous deß ation would be bad in modern economies, 
although some authors make distinctions between „good“ and „bad“ deß ation. We support ideas that 
deß ation is always „bad deß ation“, because it always reduces nominal demand and results with slow 
growth, „secular growth“ or recession. 
7  Several economists from the IMF suggested raising inß ation target above 2 percent, that is 
used as an inß ation target by European Central Bank, and by the simple rule is used as a standard 
measure of optimal inß ation rate. Also, rather neglected in economic literature and in the post – cri-
sis practice of central banks that inß ation target has to be „asymmetrical“, due to the high level of 
risks of low inß ation and/or outright deß ation for the macroeconomic stability and Þ nancial system 
stability. 
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system, banks will ß ood the economy with money substitutes during booms and 
precipitate futile efforts at general liquidation thereafter“(p. 114; and Simmons, 
1936). In order to neutralize instability of the banks, central banks developed var-
ious types of liquidity facilities (lender-of-last-resort, LoLR) and capital regula-
tions. But, crucial is that „over the past 30 years, central banks have largely aban-
doned any explicit focus on the total amount or the allocation of private credit 
created“(p. 114). This is the major systemic failure of Þ nancial intermediation 
mechanism in a modern banking system. Stimulating nominal demand by the 
credit and money creation is left at the discretion of private banks and other Þ nan-
cial institutions (shadow banking), that are proÞ t – maximizing organizations, 
without focus on externalities and macroeconomic policy goals. As Keynes de-
scribed credit–Þ nanced speculation, Lord Turner explained that „potential discon-
nect between capital goods speculation and current nominal demand is central to 
understanding the dynamics and implications of real estate credit and asset price 
cycles“ (p.117). Credit creation that Þ nances purchase of existing real estate does 
not stimulate nominal GDP to the same extent as credit granted directly to Þ nance 
new real investment or consumption. Thus, taking into account that excessive 
credit and money creation by the private banks, and domestic and external deregu-
lation of the Þ nancial markets, accompanied with the restrictions on Þ at money 
creation by the central banks (removal of „discount window“ and quantitative 
monetary policy instruments), there are two effective responses to the failures of 
pre–crisis orthodoxy in monetary policy: removal of commitment to free market 
allocation of credit and removal of the absolute ban of Þ at money creation (p. 129). 
This is the most important point of a very complex set of ideas presented in this 
book, we could say that this is the major contribution to the post – crisis monetary 
theory. As Lord Turner simply describes „the underlying principle is that we can-
not rely on free market credit creation to produce either an optimal allocation of 
capital or an adequate and stable level of nominal demand“(p. 130). Implications 
for policy are considered in Parts IV and V. Part III, chapter 9, explores the role of 
international capital ß ows in global Þ nancial crisis, when capital account liberal-
ization was one of the basic preconditions in IMF conditionality8 and it brings in-
8  IMF in Hong Kong in 1997 proposed capital account liberalization as a requirement for 
IMF membership. Fortunately, it was not accepted and IMF changed its view on capital controls 
(„institutional view“ of the IMF was published in November, 2012). Oxford economist Ilene Grabel 
called this „productive incoherence“. Productive incoherence refers to the proliferation of inconsis-
tent and even contradictory strategies and statements by the IMF into new regime. Those who see 
continuity at the IMF emphasize the reassertion of the IMF’s authority, the reiteration of pro-cyclical 
policy adjustment and the maintenance of existing governance patterns within the institution. In con-
trast, evidence of discontinuity includes the normalisation of capital controls and Fund conditional-
ity programmes that are inconsistent in key respects. We could say that such views of the IMF were 
very harmful for some of the IMF members, where policy makers were under inß uence of the IMF, 
such as Croatia, where central bank implemented capital account liberalization that was reinforcing 
D. RADOŠEVIĆ: Between Debt and the Devil: Money, Credit and Fixing Global Finance
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 67 (5) 496-514 (2016) 505
stability that was „imported“ into the emerging market economies and „EU pe-
riphery“ countries. In Eurozone, design of monetary union without Þ scal union, 
produced the Eurozone Þ nancial crisis, with severe debt overhang and divergence 
between „core EU“ and „EU periphery“. Lord Turner thinks that „unless the Eu-
rozone can agree to the radical reforms required to support adequate nominal de-
mand growth, breakup may be inevitable and preferable to continued slow growth 
and deß ation9“(p. 131). Eurozone enlargement, in particular entry of the economi-
cally weak countries into the European monetary union (Greece, Italy, Spain, Slo-
venia, etc.), diminished and removed exchange–rate risk and facilitated harmful 
private borrowing, while sovereign risk was underestimated by the private banks, 
although EU did not design crisis mechanisms in the case of Eurozone instability. 
The free market misallocated capital, and in 2010 international capital ß ows in the 
Eurozone suddenly stopped, leaving EU periphery economies with a particularly 
severe debt overhang problem. Radical reform of the incomplete monetary union 
is needed. Strengthening monetary union or making the EU and Eurozone some 
kind of the „ß exible union“ (or „differentiated integration“ approach), with differ-
ent approach to political union, in particular after Brexit, will have to deal with 
inefÞ cient and fragmented Þ nancial markets and instability in Eurozone. Dr. Turn-
er made a consistent proposal for Eurozone crisis: „The general point is clear. In 
domestic economies both the quantity and the category of mix of credit creation 
must be actively managed, and countries (or currency unions) need domestic poli-
cy tolls that can offset the depressive effects of debt overhang resulting from past 
policy errors. Among countries, meanwhile, the wrong sort of capital ß ows must 
sometimes be constrained. The idea that international Þ nancial integration is al-
ways and in all respects beneÞ cial is a delusion“(p. 159). In next two chapters (Part 
IV and Part V), the author describes his proposals for radical monetary reform in 
market economies. This is the most challenging part of the book, where dr. Turner 
explains how to Þ x the Þ nancial system to prevent excessive credit expansion and 
how to escape the debt overhang created by the past policy mistakes. This part of 
the book focuses on the ideas and principles that should guide radical monetary 
unofÞ cial euroization (dollarization) of the Þ nancial system, and produced debt overhang problem, 
including excessive external macroeconomic imbalances. 
9  It is astonishing how ECB underestimated deß ation risk in Eurozone. For instance, dr. 
Peter Praet, member of the Executive Board of the ECB, in his interview in December 2014 said: 
„No, we don’t really think that there is a high risk of a recession in the euro area. Also the risk of 
broadly-based deß ation in the euro area is not high. And we don’t see risks for the Þ nancial system 
as was the case in 2012, when the euro area was on the brink of a dangerous downward spiral.“ 
But, after only a month, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) on 22 January 
2015 announced an expanded asset purchase programme (EAPP): „Aimed at fulÞ lling the ECB’s 
price stability mandate, this programme will see the ECB add the purchase of sovereign bonds to its 
existing private sector asset purchase programmes in order to address the risks of a too prolonged 
period of low inß ation.“
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reform. Its basic idea is that – in addition to policy action designed to make Þ nan-
cial system more stable (bank recapitalization, etc.) – it is even more important to 
manage the quantity and inß uence the allocation of credit in real economy. Chap-
ter 1 describes three pre – crisis mistaken ideas, which are: liquidity and complete 
Þ nancial markets are beneÞ cial for economy and stability; inß ation targeting is 
insufÞ cient, while bank balance-sheet matters more; and much credit growth is 
unnecessary and potentially harmful. Brieß y, the Þ rst set of ideas refers to the 
theory that if Þ nancial markets are more deep and sophisticated, and more innova-
tive it could bring positive effects on economic growth. This idea neglects the risks 
of unregulated Þ nancial markets. The second mistaken idea was that inß ation tar-
geting monetary strategy by the central banks will bring inß ation under control 
and Þ nancial stability. Pre – crisis orthodoxy taught that growth of private bank 
money had no necessary and proportionate implications for price inß ation. Mon-
etarist theories taught that prices must be driven by the total amount of money in 
circulation, and that velocity of money would be somewhat stable. But, when both 
credit and money increased more rapidly than nominal GDP, increasing leverage 
(credit divided by nominal GDP) had as a consequence declining velocity of mon-
ey (nominal GDP divided by money). Different dynamics of leverage and velocity 
of money arises from the fact that most credit was not devoted to Þ nancing new 
productive capital investments but to funding the purchase of already existing as-
sets. In a nutshell, stocks of credit and money (or other bank liabilities) can grow 
more rapidly than GDP without ever producing high inß ation which was targeted 
by the central bank strategy, or brieß y to say, price inß ation could be low, stable 
and under control, while asset price inß ation is rapidly rising, but central banks 
will feel not compelled to respond with counter – cyclical policy measures. As-
set–price inß ation would then lead to debt overhang and it will inevitably bring 
Þ nancial instability and Þ nancial crisis, which was the case with Croatia and other 
SEE economies. Lord Turner correctly concludes, that while money is not a good 
forward indicator of inß ation, the stock of credit matters because of potential im-
plications for Þ nancial stability, debt overhang and deß ation. In the future we 
had to constrain the growth of that stock (p. 171). The third mistaken idea of the 
pre–crisis orthodoxy was that credit growth was assumed essential to stimulate 
nominal demand and to ensure adequate investment. Pre–crisis theory assumed 
that there is a positive, linear and limitless relationship between Þ nancial deepen-
ing and economic development. But, post–crisis monetary theory and experience 
with Þ nancial crisis in some countries, recognized that it is more „inverted U“ 
relationship, and that beyond some threshold, rising private debt to GDP can cause 
harm and bring Þ nancial instability10. We therefore need policy levers that can 
10  These post – crisis theories on the potential instability of private debt beyond certain lev-
els, were recognized by the EU experts, although too late to prevent Þ nancial crisis in Eurozone, 
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constrain excessive credit growth. It is far more important, then just Þ xing the 
banks, changing architecture of the Þ nancial system after the crisis. Lord Turner, 
of course, is not against Þ xing the system through a new bank resolution proce-
dures, or institutional reform, such as ring – fencing (making a difference between 
investment and commercial banks, too-big-to-fail problem), ensuring much higher 
equity capital requirements11, etc. The author describes (Chapter 11, “Fixing Fun-
damentals”) several preconditions that have to be fulÞ lled before Þ nancial reform: 
(a) regulation of real estate problem and instability it brings into the modern mar-
ket economies (problem of insufÞ cient supply of real estate, easing constraints on 
new real estate development and Þ nancial regulation that will constrain demand 
and supply of real estate bank credits); (b) rising inequality that is related to the 
real estate problem (how to limit availability of real estate credit and protect cus-
tomers of the banks from unsustainable debt contracts); and, (c) global imbalances 
(there is an urgent need to deal with large current – account imbalances that have 
been one of the important drivers of excessive credit growth. In particular, these 
imbalances are very large in Eurozone, and new adjustment policies have to be 
designed to stimulate domestic demand in EU, while there is also a problem with 
China). In the next part of the book (Chapter 12, „Abolishing Banks, Taxing Debt 
Pollution and Encouraging Equity“), dr. Turner explains why he is against radical 
proposals to abolish completely private bank credit creation, abolishing fractional 
reserve banking system, introducing 100 % reserve banking, as a modern version 
of „The Chicago Plan“. All deposits in commercial banks will be redeposited at 
the central bank (100 percent reserves), the money supply would be equal to mon-
etary base and „banking multiplier“ through which banks create private money in 
addition to Þ at money would be abolished12. Basically, according to the views of 
and various thresholds were included in the methodology for the assesment of macroeconomic im-
balances within European Semester mechanism (Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, MIP). The 
headline indicators in MIP (MIP Scoreboard) consist of the indicators and indicative thresholds, 
covering the major sources of macroeconomic imbalances, for instance: private sector debt (con-
solidated) in % of GDP with a threshold of 133%; private sector credit ß ow in % of GDP with a 
threshold of 14%; year-on-year changes in house prices relative to a Eurostat consumption deß ator, 
with a threshold of 6%; general government sector debt in % of GDP with a threshold of 60%; and 
for external imbalances, threshold is net international investment (NIIP) position as percent of GDP, 
with a threshold of -35%. EU designed MIP after the crisis in Eurozone started, and now it is „cor-
rective“, rather than „preventive“ mechanism of policy coordination in EU. 
11  It is interesting that Dr. Turner is in favour of higher capital requirements as equity buffers 
when problems arise, rather than „bail – in“ scheme, that is introduced as a main principle in a new 
bank resolution strategy of the EU (and ESM). 
12  It is interesting how cross – border EU banking groups (banks operating in several coun-
tries abroad, but with HQ only in one of the EU countries), reacted in Þ nancial crisis, through their 
subsidiaries in transition/emerging European economies. When Þ nancial crisis occurred, private 
banks started deleveraging and capital reversals, for instance in CESEE countries, bringing thus ad-
ditional instability into these economies. Then EU, EBRD and IMF organized „Vienna Initiative“, 
D. RADOŠEVIĆ: Between Debt and the Devil: Money, Credit and Fixing Global Finance
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 67 (5) 496-514 (2016)508
Friedman, Fisher and Simmons, money – Þ nanced Þ scal deÞ cits were the best way 
to stimulate economies in deß ationary times, but appropriate targets could ensure 
that the sizes of the unfunded deÞ cits was compatible with desirable slow expan-
sion in the level of nominal GDP. We cannot but agree with Lord Turner’s views 
that such radical proposal would be too narrow and impossible in modern post – 
crisis Þ nancial systems, although we could embrace its key conclusion: that private 
money creation was at the root cause of the Þ nancial crisis and that limitless abil-
ity of the private banks to create credit and money has to be strictly regulated by 
the central banks. What matters for the modern post – crisis Þ nancial system is to 
manage the quantity and mix of credit that the banking or shadow banking system 
creates. Thus, here it is an important role of central banks and regulators. 
Deregulated banking system has created too much of the wrong sort of debt. 
Three things matter: the pace of credit growth, the level of private – sector leverag-
ing and the mix of debt by category. The rapid credit growth indicates rapid debt 
accumulation, which at the certain level of private – sector leverage - that is con-
sidered as unsustainable level of indebtedness - determines the severity of debt 
overhang. Rapid rise of debt and high private–sector leverage precipitates Þ nancial 
crisis and boom–bust cycle. Excessive credit creation is forward indicator of asset 
- price inß ation, Þ nancial crisis, post–crisis debt overhang and deß ation. Deciding 
when asset bubble has started, the size of divergence from market equilibrium and 
when the bubble is expected to burst is an art, not a science. Different types of debt 
contracts create different risks, and debt mix is very important, in addition to level 
of indebtedness. There are simple rules and thresholds that deÞ ne how much debt 
is too much and what mix of debt is optimal. Lord Turner proposes a clear phi-
losophy: we need to constrain the quantity and inß uence the mix of debt that banks 
and shadow banks create (chapter 13, part IV, „Managing the Quantity and Mix of 
a working group/coordinating mechanism of multilaterals and private banks with its primary goals 
to coordinate sudden stop, deleveraging and capital outß ows from CESEE economies, in order to 
prevent sovereign defaults in these countries. But, the main instrument for such policy was that 
private banks should not decrease their exposure in the CESEE bellow pre – crisis levels (although, 
there was no appropriate mechanism for the regulation and sanctions) and that post – crisis private 
credit creation will be funded by the increase of the deposits at banks. Actually, Vienna Initiative 
introduced some kind of transitional credit mechanism that is similar to 100 % reserves banking, 
the national banking system can be in effect treated as if it were in part a 100 % reserve system 
and in part a fractional reserve banking. Fiscal policy was implemented in accordance with Fiscal 
Compact. To conclude, CESEE economies fell into outright deß ation, and they were not able to 
reduce debt overhang. Post – crisis macroeconomic policies in CESEE countries could be simply 
described as a 100 % reserves banking, with the prohibition of money – Þ nanced Þ scal deÞ cits, that 
are targeted through Þ scal consolidation strategies (austerity). Debt – deß ation crisis, paradox-of-
thrift recession and balance – sheet crises are inevitable implications of such post – crisis monetary 
arrangements. Deß ation and secular stagnation or even stagdeß ation, with high unemployment, are 
inevitable results of such economic/Þ nancial policies. 
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Debt“). That will require Þ ve sets of policies: (1) bank regulation designed not 
merely to make the banking system itself safe but also constrain lending to the real 
economy particularly against real estate; (2) constraints on risky non–bank credit 
intermediation of shadow banking), even if are at the expense of reduced market 
liquidity; (3) constraints on borrowers’ access to credit; (4) measures to put sand in 
the wheels of harmful short–term debt capital ß ows; and, (5) actions to ensure that 
there is enough credit to fund required capital investments, for instance through 
the creation of banks with a dedicated focus on speciÞ c lending categories (p. 195 
– 196). We will brieß y explain details of such policies. Slowing down credit booms 
could be achieved using interest rate as a monetary policy tool. Advantage of this 
policy instrument is that it has linear impact on all categories of debt contracts and 
it is difÞ cult to avoid its inß uence, as it is possible when central bank is using quan-
titative policy instruments, because there is always opportunity of „regulatory ar-
bitrage“. In particular, we have to agree that the most effective way to lean against 
the credit and asset–price booms is raising interest rates. If money interest rates 
were set bellow Wicksell’s „natural rate of interest“, as dr. Turner suggests, there 
were strong incentives to borrow cheap money, making credit and asset–price 
booms and bringing Þ nancial instability. This argument was made by William 
White (2012), one of the few economists who warned of the dangers of private 
credit booms before the crisis. Major disadvantage of interest rate as a policy tool 
is that different categories of debt contracts could have different elasticity of re-
sponse to changing rates, and then interest rate policy could become ineffective. In 
the book, the author refers to the interest rate policy of the Swedish Riksbank be-
tween 2011 – 2014, which was quite unsuccessful and property boom in Stock-
holm continued in spite of the raising interest rates. Constraining bank credit cre-
ation is possible, by using central bank macro prudential instruments. The essen-
tial problem is that there is no natural rate of interest, when credit is used for dif-
ferent purposes, but there are instead several different and potentially unstable 
expected rates of return. Thus post – crisis monetary policy options need to abol-
ish pre–crisis monetary orthodoxy that interest rate policy has neutral impact on 
credit allocation, and new policies has to rely to quantitative levers, including ones 
that discriminate among different categories of credit. This means that central 
banks have to use more „targeted“ policy instruments, aiming to constrain the 
level of debt and mix of debt contracts13. The main policy for constraining bank 
credit creation, could be capital requirements, because higher capital buffers could 
reduce risks and could resolve the too-big-to-fail problem. In the book, there is 
13  The use of „quantitative instruments“ to control credit and bank liquidity necessarily inß u-
enced money creation and inß ation and had an impact on credit allocation as banks substituted the 
assets on their balance sheets. Credit controls often have to be backed up with capital controls and 
could thus be targeted speciÞ cally at the banking sector without leading to an exchange of assets 
with the rest of the Þ nancial sector (see, Monnet, 2014). 
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proposal to signiÞ cantly increase capital adequacy ratio from 4,5 % (actual regula-
tory requirement for major banks is in the 7 - 10 % range) to 20 – 25 % of the gross 
unweighted value of their assets (p. 199). Essentially, this means that leverage ratio 
for the private commercial banks should be limited to the level of 4 : 1. But the 
issue is how to raise equity capital buffers without exacerbating the deß ationary 
impact of deleveraging? This book’s central argument is that we must constrain 
private credit growth; the pace of credit growth and the structure of debt mix. 
Much higher capital requirements is policy instrument designed for ensuring long–
term Þ nancial stability. But, taking into account volatility of Þ nancial cycles, with 
swings from boom to bust phases, this capital requirements are applied throughout 
the whole economic cycle. What we need is a counter–cyclical policy instrument 
that can lean against the cycle. These are counter–cyclical capital buffers, that 
central banks could use in order to prevent asset bubbles. Reserve ratios are addi-
tional policy options, which could affect bank credit growth. It is usually deÞ ned 
as quantitative reserve requirements, minimum reserves that commercial banks 
must hold at the central bank as a proportion of all liabilities or assets, remuner-
ated or interest–free holdings, which deÞ nes whether this tool will impose a tax on 
credit intermediation? Reserve asset requirements are in form a quantitative rather 
than price tool, but have signiÞ cant implications on interest rates. The major prob-
lem here is also that different categories of credits can have different elasticity of 
response, while there is a need for differentiated approach when central banks ap-
ply this policy instrument. Lord Turner made speciÞ c proposals that capital re-
quirements have to be established against speciÞ c categories of lending; risk 
weight should reß ect social, not private, risk. Palley (2004) in his paper argues for 
developing a new system of Þ nancial regulation based upon asset-based reserve 
requirements (ABRRs). Such a system represents a shift in regulatory focus away 
from the traditional concern with the liability side of Þ nancial intermediaries’ bal-
ance sheets. ABRRs have both signiÞ cant macroeconomic and microeconomic 
advantages. At the macroeconomic level they can provide policy makers with ad-
ditional policy instruments. In the book there is the important conclusion that cen-
tral banks need to ensure that capital requirements for different types of credit 
reß ect systemic and macroeconomic risks. That could be achieved either through 
maximum leverage ratios (that is, capital requirements against the gross unweight-
ed value of assets. Leverage ratios for private banks are not yet limited by the 
Basel III rules) or by setting risk weights for real estate lending signiÞ cantly high-
er. Constraints on borrower’s access to credit could be regulated by maximum al-
lowable LTV or LTI limits in the residential mortgage market and commercial real 
estate. There are strong arguments in principle for preferring LTI, since it more 
directly addresses the issue of debt servicing capacity and better constrains the 
danger of self–reinforcing credit and asset–price cycles. Structural measures in 
monetary reform are also very important, for instance ring–fencing in and be-
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tween countries. They could be also an establishment of specialized banks for 
speciÞ c types of debt contract Þ nance (investment banks, etc.), that excludes real 
estate Þ nance and other more risky types of debt contracts. Central bank policy 
instruments such as directed bank credit towards productive investments are also 
possible. We refer to „functional efÞ ciency“ of the Þ nancial system (term coined 
by James Tobin), that is, the ability of the Þ nancial system to provide Þ nance for 
long – term investment. The practice of rediscounting private – sector loans by the 
central bank could be necessary, to increase „functional efÞ ciency“ of the post–
crisis Þ nancial systems. All these measures have one single aim, and that is to 
provide enough of the right sort of the debt. Faced with a free market bias toward 
real estate lending, interventions favouring other types of lending are justiÞ ed. 
Lord Turner’s reform agenda set out above represents a dramatic rejection of the 
pre–crisis orthodoxy. Some elements of it are already accepted by the central 
banks and regulators, such as capital requirements, counter–cyclical capital buf-
fers add some other macro prudential rules, to ensure stability of the Þ nancial 
systems, but some of the basic requirements of Basel III standards were delayed or 
not fully applied (level and deÞ nition of capital, leverage ratio, the treatment of 
regional German banks, transition period for full application of Basel III rules, 
etc.; see more in: Howarth, 2014). But other go far beyond post – crisis consensus: 
constraints on the pace of credit growth and level of debt, and intervention by the 
central banks in the allocation of credit, using different approaches in regulation 
of different types of debt categories. Private credit creation is inherently unstable 
(Fisher, Knight, Keynes, Simmons, Minsky), and central banks should intervene 
against free market credit creation bias towards „speculative“ Þ nance. Central 
banks have wide – ranging responsibilities (Eichengreen, 2011; Borio, 2014) and 
they have to prevent future Þ nancial crisis. Part V. of the book answers a question 
how to escape from the debt overhang left behind by past policy mistakes? The 
author is willing to consider all policy options (in chapter 14, Part V, „Monetary 
Finance – Breaking the Taboo“), including „overt money Þ nance“ - OMF (or, „He-
licopter Money“), creating additional Þ at money to Þ nance increased Þ scal deÞ -
cits. InsufÞ cient demand is the main problem in post–crisis recovery, and debt 
overhang prevent implementation of traditional Þ scal policy stimulus, due to 
„crowding out“ and „Ricardian equivalence“ effects. Post–crisis theory explains 
that Þ scal policy could stimulate nominal demand, because there is underemploy-
ment and spare capacity, so direct Þ scal stimulus effect will produce additional 
real growth as well as price inß ation. In such circumstances, faster GDP growth 
could reduce future debt to GDP ratio. But, there are limits to our ability to use 
traditional Þ scal stimulus to escape the debt trap. Thus we need to Þ nd policies that 
stimulate nominal demand and do not result in rising public debt. Now, it comes to 
“Helicopter Money” explained by Milton Friedman (1948). He said that inade-
quate nominal demand is one problem to which there is always a possible solu-
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tion. If an economy was suffering from deÞ cient demand, he suggested, the gov-
ernment should print dollar bills and scatter them from a helicopter. People would 
pick them up and spend them; nominal GDP would increase; and some mix of 
higher inß ation and higher real output would result. The magnitude of impact of 
helicopter money is determined with the people propensity to spend, or it would 
depend on how much people spend rather than saved their new–found Þ nancial 
wealth. The macroeconomic impact of helicopter money is dependent by the size 
of monetary stimulus, in terms of proportion of monetary stimulus in GDP. Lord 
Turner summarizes Friedman’s simple example, as three truths: „We can always 
stimulate nominal demand by printing Þ at money; if we print too much, we will 
generate harmful inß ation; but, if we print only a small amount, we will produce 
only small and potentially desirable effects“ (p. 219). Essential principle of heli-
copter money in modern Þ nancial system could be applied as an electronic transfer 
to all citizens to their commercial bank deposit account. This will have immediate 
impulse on increasing nominal demand. Or, alternatively, it could cut tax rates or 
increase public expenditure. Helicopter money could be implemented as a pure 
Þ scal and/or as a pure monetary stimulus. It is indeed essentially a fusion of the 
two. The main issue is whether we can contain their long–term impact in a modern 
economy with fractional reserve banks. Monetary stimulus would create addition-
al private credit creation and purchasing power created by the private banks, and 
initial stimulative effect of monetary stimulus could be multiplied through frac-
tional reserve banking system. This was the reason why Irving Fisher, Henry Sim-
mons and lately Milton Friedman supported the idea to introduce 100 % reserve 
banks. Monetary stimulus with 100 % reserve banks will offset deposit multiplica-
tion of initial monetary stimulus, containing thus the potential ability of the pri-
vate banks credit creation, and introducing a sort of Þ nancial discipline into the 
Þ nancial system. For them, 100 % reserve system and overt money Þ nance of 
small Þ scal deÞ cits were thus a completed policy package.  Lord Turner correctly 
concludes that these policy approaches also suggest the obvious solution: „any 
dangers of excessive long – term demand stimulus can be offset if central banks 
impose reserve asset requirements“ (p. 221). This would in fact impose a 100 % 
requirement on the new Þ at money creation. In addition, it would be important if 
central banks will remunerate these bank reserves or they will not pay interest on 
them. Reserve requirements remunerated at a zero interest rate impose a tax on 
future credit creation. Money – Þ nanced deÞ cits today, suggests Dr. Turner, plus 
implicit taxes on credit intermediation tomorrow might be the optimal combina-
tion. There are three speciÞ c uses of over money Þ nance: Bernanke’s helicopter 
money; one–off debt write–off, and, radical bank recapitalization. In Eurozone 
countries, overt money Þ nance is strictly forbidden by the Maastricht Agreement 
and Articles of the Agreement (Statute) of the European Central Bank. ECB has 
not any legal mandate to implement such a policy (i.e. ECB Article 123.1), while 
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US Federal Reserve was able to implement such monetary policy. But, the author 
suggested that rebooting the Eurozone will not be possible without Þ scal as well 
monetary stimulus ideally combined in the form of monetary Þ nance. The best 
pragmatic short – term strategy, may involve operation that post facto turns out 
to be money Þ nance, but whose essential nature can be denied for fear of legal 
and political challenges14. Money Þ nance could be one – off or continuous policy, 
while in the case of secular stagnation, money Þ nance could be a continuous de-
vice, with necessary constraints to limit adverse consequences of helicopter mon-
ey in modern Þ nancial system with fractional reserve banks. Money Þ nance could 
be limited within constraints of central bank independence and inß ation targeting 
(see, Turner, 2015). Chapter 15, Part V, „Between Debt and the Devil – A Choice 
of Dangers“), summarizes the analysis of the previous chapter and presents some 
concluding remarks. Lord Turner suggests how to solve dilemma between debt 
(debt overhang) and the devil (Þ nancial crisis and secular stagnation) within new 
paradigm for post – crisis economics. „Pre – crisis orthodoxy combined total 
anathema against Þ at money Þ nance with an almost totally relaxed attitude to 
private credit creation. Optimal future policy must reß ect reality that we face a 
choice of dangers and must combine far tighter controls on private credit creation 
with the disciplined use of Þ at money Þ nance when needed“ (p. 240). The book 
provides nicely written and well-structured review of monetary economics and 
main currents of post – crisis monetary theories. It is a necessary reading for aca-
demic Þ nancial experts, policymakers, central bank and government decision - 
makers, in advanced as well as in emerging economies, in designing post – crisis 
Þ nancial and economic policies. 
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